Automotive Networking

Automotive Ethernet

An independent IEEE 802.3 Ethernet MAC-frame BFM, written clean-room from the public frame format (preamble/SFD/dst-MAC/src-MAC/EtherType/payload/FCS) — not derived from the catalog’s own…

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shippingGroup Automotive NetworkingStandard IEEE 802.3 (single-pair automotive PHY variants: 10BASE-T1S/100BASE-T1/1000BASE-T1)

Available now — real, tested verification collateral, not a roadmap placeholder.

Verification IP is not safety-rated. These are testbench components — no ASIL target, no FMEDA, no IP-XACT, no safety-mechanism interface. They exist to help you verify a design, not to carry a safety argument. The safety soft-IP catalog is over here.

The deliverable

What you get

Bus-functional model

An independent driver for the protocol, written clean-room from the public specification — not derived from our own RTL, so it is a genuine second source.

Passive protocol checker

A monitor that watches the bus and asserts the spec’s rules continuously, so a violation fails the run where it happens rather than downstream.

Self-checking interop testbench

A one-command testbench that drives the model against real RTL and hard-checks the result — reproduce every claim on day one.

An independent IEEE 802.3 Ethernet MAC-frame BFM, written clean-room from the public frame format (preamble/SFD/dst-MAC/src-MAC/EtherType/payload/FCS) — not derived from the catalog’s own eth_t1_mac RTL — exercising its MAC-level byte-stream interface as a true second source. Injects frames into the DUT’s RX path with cross-checked APB register read-back, triggers a real APB-driven TX and independently recomputes CRC-32 to verify the DUT’s own FCS, and includes a directed corrupt-FCS injection proving both the DUT’s real RX CRC check and the independent passive checker correctly flag it. Scope is the MAC frame layer only — PHY-level line coding, symbol timing, and link training sit below this interface and are not covered. This second-source effort also caught and led to fixing a genuine RTL bug (2026-07-09): eth_t1_mac‘s unicast destination-MAC filter used to silently drop the frame’s first two bytes from the RX FIFO (FCS still validated, so RX_ERR never flagged it) — fixed by deepening the RX pipeline so eviction never starts before the filter decision is settled, verified against the IP’s full existing regression suite plus this VIP’s own interop TB.

Key Features

Independent Ethernet frame BFM: SEND_FRAME (drives preamble+SFD+dst+src+ethertype+payload+FCS, computing CRC-32 itself) / CAPTURE_FRAME (decodes and independently re-verifies FCS on transmitted frames)
Passive frame-boundary + FCS-validity checker on the TX byte stream, recomputing CRC-32 independently rather than trusting the DUT’s own CRC register
Self-checking interop TB: RX injection with APB register read-back, and a real APB-triggered TX independently captured and verified
Directed corrupt-FCS injection proving both the DUT’s own RX CRC check and the independent checker catch it; this second-source effort also caught and fixed a real unicast-filter byte-drop bug (2026-07-09)

Standards & Compliance

IEEE 802.3 (single-pair automotive PHY variants: 10BASE-T1S/100BASE-T1/1000BASE-T1)

Pairs With

Built to lean against these catalog IPs during integration:

eth_t1_mac

Interested in the Automotive Ethernet VIP?

Deliverables, the file manifest, and licensing terms are shared under a mutual NDA.

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Verification IP is testbench collateral and is deliberately not safety-rated: no ASIL target, no FMEDA, and no IP-XACT descriptor. It carries no functional-safety claim.

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