Available now — real, tested verification collateral, not a roadmap placeholder.
Verification IP is not safety-rated. These are testbench components — no ASIL target, no FMEDA, no IP-XACT, no safety-mechanism interface. They exist to help you verify a design, not to carry a safety argument. The safety soft-IP catalog is over here.
An independent clean-room USB 3.x SuperSpeed link-layer VIP: a transmitter that sequences header packets and retries them, a separately written receiver that recomputes both CRCs in the CHECK direction and decides delivery on its own, and a passive link checker (usb32`/`, `make usb32_oss`, 25/25 checks). Covers header packets with a 3-bit Header Sequence Number, CRC-16 over the header and CRC-5 over the Link Control Word, link commands (LGOOD_n / LCRD_x / LBAD / LRTY / LGO_Ux / LAU / LXU), credit-based flow control over four buffers in strict A→B→C→D rotation, and the LBAD→LRTY retry. Six rules, each pinned by a per-rule mask to its own injected fault, plus a T0 that proves the CRCs are real — every single-bit flip in the 96-bit header and the 11-bit control word is detected, so no later CRC test can pass against a degenerate function. SCOPE, narrower than the name: line coding is NOT modelled (Gen1 8b/10b is vip-8b10b, and this catalog already carries a full implementation in pcie/; Gen2 128b/132b is vip-128b132b), nor is the LTSSM. The CRC polynomials and seeds are the spec’s; the final bit-mapping onto the serial wire is NOT claimed, because this VIP does not model the wire — so the CRCs verify error-detecting behaviour, not bit-level compatibility with silicon. The sharpest result is a NEGATIVE one: a retried header packet is byte-identical to the original by design, so every rule passes on both copies and passes CORRECTLY — the retry is the protocol working, not an error. Whether the receiver recognised the duplicate or handed it up a second time happens ABOVE the link and never appears on it. T9 asserts BOTH halves: the checker stays silent while a receiver without duplicate detection delivers the same packet twice.
USB-IF USB 3.2 Specification (back-compat 3.1/3.0) — link layer
Built to lean against these catalog IPs during integration:
Deliverables, the file manifest, and licensing terms are shared under a mutual NDA.
Verification IP is testbench collateral and is deliberately not safety-rated: no ASIL target, no FMEDA, and no IP-XACT descriptor. It carries no functional-safety claim.
circuit-design.space · +1-971-357-1400 · anovickis@circuit-design.space